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ABSTRACT 
 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM FIVE 
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES IN WEST AFRICA 
 
By 
 
Kablan Begniya Charlene Hermance Eboi 
 
This research investigates whether financial development can lower unemployment rate 
in five middle income countries of West Africa: Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Senegal. For this purpose, the causal relationship of Granger is firstly 
explored to determine whether financial development can cause unemployment rate in 
these five countries. Then, the impulse response function is applied to identify the 
positive, negative or null impact from an increase of financial development on future 
unemployment rate. The method employed in this study is Vector Auto Regression (VAR) 
using annual time series data over the period 1991-2012 for each respective countries. 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks as share of GDP and liquid liabilities as share 
of GDP are the two measures of deepening financial development. Evidence shows that 
none of these two measures of financial development affect unemployment rate in 
Senegal. In addition, at the impulse of financial development, any response from 
 v 
 
unemployment would be recorded in the coming eight years. However, the findings 
suggest that financial development under the proxy of domestic credit to private sector by 
banks is monumental to reduce unemployment in Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire. 
Undeniably, this proxy causes unemployment in the above two French colonies. 
Furthermore, escalating domestic credit to private sector will lower unemployment at the 
first, second and third year in Cape Verde as well as in Cote d’Ivoire. As of Nigeria and 
Senegal, the English colonies of this paper, the comprehensive money supply is the key 
to reach a decline in unemployment level. Indeed, liquid liabilities cause unemployment 
rate. At that, a one percent increase of liquid liabilities will reduce unemployment rate in 
Ghana at the third, fourth and sixth years. In the case of Nigeria, a shrinking of 
unemployment level will come out at the sixth year. Besides this empirical testing, an 
inquiry of the International Finance Corporation’s enterprise survey has been initiated. 
The purpose is to discover which of the small, medium or large enterprises profit from 
banking loans in their daily activities. The findings prove that the share of large firms 
benefiting from the lending system disproportionately exceeds the share of small and 
medium firms. The suggestion from this research is to investigate the reasons why small 
and medium businesses are disadvantaged as compared to large firms. This will give a 
hand to the financial sector in enhancing the positive effect of loan in countries such as 
Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, in nations such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, 
the positive impact of loans on underprivileged enterprises will materialize. Consequently, 
small and medium companies will access loans, ameliorate the running of their 
businesses and consequently leading to job creation. 
 
 vi 
 
  
 vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would have never been able to reach the end of this thesis without support and 
indispensable collaboration. For their help and contribution, in one or other way, I would 
like to express my deepest gratitude to the following institution and persons. 
The Korean Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management, 
which bestowed me the scholarship and facilities to make this project possible. 
Mrs. Lin Shu-Chin, finance and development professor, subject specialist and 
statistician who accepted to supervise the project. Her general advices as well as her help 
in choice of methodology and data analysis have been precious. 
Mr. Lee Seung-Joo, entrepreneurship and development’s professor, who agreed 
to be the other member of my thesis committee. His comments and suggestions have 
been valuable to complete this research. 
Mr. Lee Kye-Woo, Advanced Research Seminar’s professor, for his fruitful 
criticisms and suggestions throughout his consultancy time. 
Mr. Hahm Sang-Moon, my academic supervisor, for his fertile and illuminating 
advice. His emphasize on supervisor choice helped me to gather the exceptional POS 
committee. 
Mrs. Lisa Lim, academic writing’s professor, for her constructive advice in 
reviewing literature and tips for thesis writing. 
Last but not the least, all KDI School’s friends, for proofreading and undertaking 
grammar checking of this thesis.  
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xiii 
 
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 1 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................... 6 
2.1. INVESTMENT ................................................................................................. 6 
2.2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP ................................................................................ 10 
2.3. INCLUSIVE GROWTH: POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY ........ 13 
2.3.1. Direct mechanism .................................................................................. 13 
2.3.2. Indirect mechanism ............................................................................... 15 
 
3. METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 16 
3.1. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION .................................. 17 
3.1.1. Unit root tests ......................................................................................... 17 
3.1.2. Test of lag length ................................................................................... 18 
3.1.3. Vector AutoRegression and model specification ................................ 18 
3.1.4. Diagnostic checking: Normality, Stability and Correlation tests ..... 19 
3.1.5. Granger causality .................................................................................. 20 
3.1.6. Impulse Response Function .................................................................. 21 
3.2. DATA ............................................................................................................. 21 
3.2.1. Relation bank-private sector ................................................................ 21 
3.2.2. Model variables ..................................................................................... 22 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ..................................................................................... 25 
4.1. PRELIMINARY RESULTS: PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACCESS TO 
FINANCE .................................................................................................................. 25 
4.1.1. Cape Verde............................................................................................. 25 
4.1.2. Cote d’Ivoire .......................................................................................... 25 
4.1.3. Ghana ..................................................................................................... 26 
 ix 
 
4.1.4. Nigeria .................................................................................................... 26 
4.1.5. Senegal .................................................................................................... 27 
4.2. FORMAL TEST FINDINGS ......................................................................... 27 
4.2.1. Unit root results ..................................................................................... 28 
4.2.2. Cape Verde............................................................................................. 28 
4.2.2.1. Domestic credit to private sector ........................................................ 28 
4.2.2.2. Liquid liabilities ................................................................................... 31 
4.2.3. Cote d’Ivoire .......................................................................................... 34 
4.2.3.1. Domestic credit to private sector ........................................................ 34 
4.2.3.2. Liquid liabilities ................................................................................... 37 
4.2.4. Ghana ..................................................................................................... 39 
4.2.4.1. Domestic credit to private sector ........................................................ 39 
4.2.4.2. Liquid liabilities ................................................................................... 42 
4.2.5. Nigeria .................................................................................................... 45 
4.2.5.1. Domestic credit to private sector ........................................................ 45 
4.2.5.2. Liquid liabilities ................................................................................... 47 
4.2.6. Senegal .................................................................................................... 50 
4.2.6.1. Domestic credit to private sector ........................................................ 50 
4.2.6.2. Liquid liabilities ................................................................................... 52 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 55 
 
ANNEXES ....................................................................................................................... 60 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 66 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Data Description ................................................................................................. 24 
Table 2: Unit Root Estimation .......................................................................................... 28 
Table 3: Eigenvalue Stability Test's Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 .............................. 29 
Table 4: Lagrange-multiplier Test's Result in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 ................................ 29 
Table 5: Skewness Test’s Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 .............................................. 29 
Table 6: Results from Granger Causality Wald in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 ......................... 30 
Table 7: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 .................... 31 
Table 8: Eigenvalue Stability Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2 ................................ 32 
Table 9: Lagrange-multiplier Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2 ................................. 32 
Table 10: Skewness Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2 ............................................... 32 
Table 11: Results from Granger Causality Wald tests in Cape Verde: Proxy 2 ............... 32 
Table 12: Results from Impulse Response Function ........................................................ 33 
Table 13: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1 .................................... 34 
Table 14: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 1 ..................................... 35 
Table 15: Skewness Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1..................................................... 35 
Table 16: Results from Granger Causality Wald tests in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1............. 35 
Table 17: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 1 ................ 36 
Table 18: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2 .................................... 37 
Table 19: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2 .................................... 37 
Table 20: Skewness Results in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 2 ..................................................... 37 
Table 21: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 2 ............ 38 
 xi 
 
Table 22: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2 ............... 38 
Table 23: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Ghana: Proxy 1 ............................................... 39 
Table 24: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Ghana: Proxy 1 ............................................... 40 
Table 25: Skewness Results in Ghana: Proxy 1................................................................ 40 
Table 26: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Ghana: Proxy 1 ...................... 40 
Table 27: Results from Impulse Response Function in Ghana: Proxy 1 .......................... 41 
Table 28: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Ghana: Proxy 2 ............................................... 42 
Table 29: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Ghana: Proxy 2 ............................................... 42 
Table 30: Skewness Results in Ghana: Proxy 2................................................................ 42 
Table 31: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Ghana: proxy 2 ...................... 43 
Table 32: Results from Impulse Response Function in Ghana: proxy 2 .......................... 44 
Table 33: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1 ............................................. 45 
Table 34: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1.............................................. 45 
Table 35: Skewness Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1 .............................................................. 45 
Table 36: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Nigeria: Proxy 1 ..................... 46 
Table 37: Results from Impulse Response Function in Nigeria: Proxy 1......................... 47 
Table 38: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2 ............................................. 48 
Table 39: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2.............................................. 48 
Table 40: Skewness Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2 .............................................................. 48 
Table 41: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Nigeria: Proxy 2 ..................... 48 
Table 42: Results from Impulse Response Function in Nigeria: Proxy 2......................... 49 
Table 43: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Senegal: Proxy 1............................................. 50 
Table 44: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Senegal: Proxy 1 ............................................. 50 
 xii 
 
Table 45: Skewness Results in Senegal: Proxy 1 ............................................................. 51 
Table 46: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Senegal: Proxy 1 .................... 51 
Table 47: Results from Impulse Response Function in Senegal: Proxy 1 ........................ 52 
Table 48: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Senegal: Proxy 2............................................. 53 
Table 49: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Senegal: Proxy 2 ............................................. 53 
Table 50: Skewness Results in Senegal: Proxy 2 ............................................................. 53 
Table 51: Results Granger Causality Wald Tests in Senegal: Proxy 2 ............................. 53 
Table 52: Results from Impulse Response Function in Senegal: Proxy 2 ........................ 54 
Table 53: Annex A: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Cape Verde ............ 61 
Table 54: Annex B: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Cote d'Ivoire .......... 62 
Table 55: Annex C: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Ghana ..................... 63 
Table 56: Annex D: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Nigeria ................... 64 
Table 57: Annex E: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Senegal ................... 65 
  
 xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Impulse Response Graph in Cape Verde with the Proxy 1 ............................... 31 
Figure 2: Impulse Response Graph in Cape Verde with the Proxy 2 ............................... 33 
Figure 3: Impulse Response Graph in Cote d'Ivoire with the Proxy 1 ............................. 36 
Figure 4: Impulse Response Graph in Cote d'Ivoire with the Proxy 2 ............................. 38 
Figure 5: Impulse Response Graph in Ghana with the Proxy 1 ........................................ 41 
Figure 6: Impulse Response Graph in Ghana with the Proxy 2 ........................................ 44 
Figure 7: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 1 ...................................... 46 
Figure 8: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 2 ...................................... 49 
Figure 9: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 1 ...................................... 52 
Figure 10: Impulse Response Graph in Senegal with the Proxy 2 ................................... 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This research aims to investigate the relationship between financial development 
and unemployment in five middle income growing economies in West Africa. 
Economic growth indicators are important in measuring how well countries are 
performing. However, this measurement does not point out whether the growth is 
inclusive or not. An economic growth or a shift in a higher bracket of per-capita-income 
is not always correlated with a narrowed disparity within the population - living standard, 
business profit, job creation, and so forth - as is evident in Africa. As stated by Page 
(2012), “Africa has enjoyed fifteen years of sustained economic growth… Yet, there are 
worrying signs that this growth turnaround has not resulted in robust growth of ‘good’ 
jobs.” 1  Corroborating this view, the International Labor Organization, ILO in 2013 
pointed out that, the economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has not led to decay in the 
unemployment rate
2
. From 2008 to 2012, the joblessness rate was stuck to 7.8%, and has 
not helped in ameliorating the woes of workers (ILO, 2011). Nonetheless, the level of 
jobseekers diverge from country to country. The economies of countries in this study: 
Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal have respectively recorded  7.4%, 
4%, 3.6%, 7.5%, and 9.9 % for total unemployment rate in 2012 (World Bank indicator, 
2014). 
According to the ILO (2013), the aforementioned unemployment challenge for 
Africa is linked to its weak labor productivity. To this, Page (2012) added the deficiency 
                                                          
1
 Page, John. “Youth, Jobs, and Structural Change: Confronting Africa’s “Employment Problem”.” In 
Working Paper Series, no. 155. Tunisia, Tunis: African Development Bank, October 2012. 
2
 International Labour Organization. International Labour Office. “Global employment trends 2013: 
Recovering from a second jobs dip.” Geneva. 2013. Accessed July 29, 2014.  
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in structural change. To remedy this, the authors above have argued a fast structural 
change towards a more industrialized region for Africa. To add to the above, the theory 
of Schumpeter can be explored. This theory is summed up in the principle of innovation 
that can only be brought about by entrepreneurs (Adil, 2011)
3
. However, the advocated 
recommendations required a set of key drivers including an assortment of financial funds 
(access to finance) to support investments and innovative ideas. Besides, access to 
finance depends on financial development. Financial development is achieved when the 
financial system is able to lower the costs in generating, mobilizing and pooling saving in 
order to finance productive investments (Levine, 1997)
4
 which can lead to better job 
creation. Subsequently, financial development allows greater investment and hence job 
opportunities. Financial development encourages entrepreneurship; leading to job 
creation. Financial development improves inclusive economic growth; therefore, 
employment. However, if financial development allows only the wealthy, the educated, 
and those politically connected to access capital, then financial development reduces job 
opportunities. This implies that, financial development may have three effects on 
unemployment: positive, negative and none.  
The study on the relationship between financial development and unemployment 
in the five middle income countries in West Africa sources its first relevancy on the 
following: on one hand, the level of unemployment is linked to the level of poverty and 
inequality. And on the other hand, financial development has been suggested as a mean to 
improve economic growth and reduce inequality and poverty rate. Claessens and Feijen 
                                                          
3
 Adil, Mouhammed. “Important Theories of Unemployment and Public Policies.” Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics, no. 12-5(2011): 100-110. 
4
 Levine, Ross. “Financial Development and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35, no. 
2(1997): 688-726 
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(2007) would not counter this assertion due to their research findings. Financial 
development through agricultural productivity widening (economic growth) and less 
income poverty, minimizes the level of inequality in terms of undernourishment. 
Therefore, can financial development lower unemployment in order to scale up the level 
of economic growth inclusiveness?  
The second imperative point of this research is rooted in the demographic 
transition – pyramidal structure of the population- that Africa is going on. Contrary to the 
expectations that these demographic trends are windows for economic and social 
prosperity (Mubila, 2012), higher human resources which might trigger labor 
productivity; this transition might be a curse not only for the five countries of this 
research but also for the region. Indeed, according to statistics from 
westafricagateway.org, the population of these 5 countries represents 67.73% of the 317 
million people in West Africa in 2010
5
. Forty two percent of this figure are under the age 
of 15 years. The dependency ratio for those countries is comprised between 81.6 and 112. 
The median age falls between 17.8 years and 22.8 years; the lower percentage belongs to 
Senegal while the upper to Cape Verde
6
. The mean of median age is 18.9 years.  With 
high and disparate level of unemployment among the youth and the growing population, 
policy makers must implement suitable policy frameworks, to tackle this issue. Otherwise, 
they will have to overcome a higher level of jobseekers, poverty and inequality. From the 
aforementioned, it is important to discover whether financial development can lower 
unemployment via job creation for middle income countries characterized by youth 
                                                          
5
 http://www.westafricagateway.org/topic/demographic-trends  
6
 http://www.westafricagateway.org/topic/demographic-trends 
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population and different stage of unemployment. From the findings, governments can 
frame better policies to reduce joblessness. 
The questions underpinning this research are as follows:  
 Does financial development cause unemployment in each of the 5 countries?  
 Would financial development reduce unemployment in each particular country?  
 Do banks ease access to finance for small businesses in every specific economy? 
This study found out that the relationship between financial development and 
unemployment is diverging among countries depending on the variable. Domestic credit 
to private sector is a key player in unemployment reduction in only Cape Verde and Cote 
d’Ivoire. Even though the share of large firms beneficiating of loans is high in Cape 
Verde, a high share of SMEs enjoy access to credit. Moreover the private sector’s access 
to finance has kept increasing over years. However, liquid liabilities are the key player to 
decrease unemployment in Ghana and Nigeria. This can be due to the significant 
proportion of the labor market engaged in informal sector and the predominant share of 
young among job seeking. As for Senegal, neither domestic credit to private sector nor 
money supply M3 as percentage of GDP impact unemployment rate. 
The methodology used in this research is the time series data analysis with Vector 
Auto Regression (VAR). The model specification is in a matrix form. Unemployment is 
the dependent variable and financial development the independent variable. Domestic 
credit to private sector and liquid liabilities (M3), both as a percentage of GDP are the 
proxies of financial development. 
 5 
 
In this paper secondary data is used. The indicators of financial development and 
unemployment are from the 2014 World Bank indicators available on its website. To 
estimate the relationship between entrepreneurs and bank, the research relied on the 2007, 
2009 and 2013 enterprise survey conducted by the International Financial Corporation. 
This paper adds to the few scholarly works on this topic. By using time series five new 
countries are studied and the impact of each proxy of financial development is observed 
individually to better frame policy. However, further studies can remove the weakness of 
this study that is the limited observations to run a regression.  
 6 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Diverse theories attempt to attribute a specific cause of unemployment with numerous 
solutions adduced to curb it. As a synthesis of Adil (2011), unemployment can be rooted 
in a mismatch between demand and supply of labor, in a cyclical business theory, in a 
phenomenon of inflation or in a lack of innovation and labor productivity.
 7
 Some 
scholars from Pakistan (Shabbir et al, 2012) and others from Nigeria (Aliero et al, 2013) 
emphasized rather on financial development to get rid of the level of unemployment. In 
this paper, the review of literature will focus on how financial development contributes in 
unemployment reduction through 3 channels: investment, entrepreneurship and inclusive 
growth. 
 
2.1. INVESTMENT 
This subsection of the literature attempts to clarify and simplify how the 
development of the five functions of the financial system – financial intermediaries - 
helps in unemployment levels falling. A growing economy through capital accumulation 
or via technological innovation has been proven to be the requisite to crossing the divide 
between financial development and unemployment. This paper focuses on capital 
accumulation as a channel and the hypothesis used is the supply-leading growth. Hence, 
financial intermediaries’ development in participating to the economic growth allows 
greater investment, and consequently job opportunities. 
                                                          
7
 Adil, Mouhammed. “Important Theories of Unemployment and Public Policies.” Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics, no. 12-5(2011): 100-110. 
 7 
 
Levine (1997)
8
 is the author who divided the primary function of the financial 
system into five categories. He indicated 1) how the market frictions (information costs 
and transaction costs) induced the advent of the financial markets and intermediaries; and 
2) how each function of the financial system through the channel of capital accumulation 
contributes to the economic growth. The five functions of the financial system are: 
facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of risk; allocate resources; 
monitor managers and exert corporate control; mobilize savings; and, facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services. 
Mobilization of savings 
In the process of economic growth, production units require external capital to 
enlarge their production capacities. Nonetheless, in the absence of financial 
intermediaries and markets, collecting saving from different individuals and/or 
companies could be tough for production units. Indeed, it is costly to collect savings from 
each individual and companies. To add to this previous point, savers are reluctant to 
abandon control of their funds; they would like to access to their financial resources as 
soon as they require them. The financial intermediaries arise as the key element to 
address those complications since they may bring about different kinds of financial 
instruments and ensure the liquidity of money. 
 
 
Facilitating Risk Amelioration 
                                                          
8
 Levine, Ross. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda.” The journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. XXXV(1997): 688-726  
 8 
 
The liquidity risk associated with the market frictions has induced the emergence 
of financial institutions to ease the economic growth and development. “Liquidity is the 
ease and speed with which agents can convert assets into purchasing power at agreed 
prices”9 . Thus, the suspicions and difficulties to easily interchange those assets into 
financial resources is called the risk of liquidity. This risk matters for projects with huge 
profits since they favor the growth and development of an economy.  However, high-
return projects implied higher investments. Therefore, it will be less likely to implement 
projects of high return if financial intermediaries do not enhance the liquidity of the long 
term investment. 
Acquiring Information about Investments and Allocating Resources 
In the presence of financial intermediaries, those intermediaries obtain and 
evaluate information on behalf of multiple investors. Hence, they become one of the 
engines of economic growth. In the example of Levine (1997), it is assumed that the cost 
of information procurement for a production technology is fixed. Moreover, each investor 
must pay this cost in the absence of an intermediary to evaluate the firm’s project. 
Entrusted this function to the financial system will remove the burden that each investor 
would have done to examine the profitability of their investment. Also, it will ease the 
operations and lower the transactions costs. 
 
Monitoring Managers and Exerting Corporate Control 
                                                          
9
 Levine, Ross. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda.” The journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. XXXV(1997): 6688-726 
 9 
 
The impossibility of monitoring and exerting corporate control are functions 
which can obstruct the mobilization of funds from savers to finance investment. Apart 
from information acquiring, the financial intermediaries after its lending activity is better 
off in project monitoring and corporate control exercising. Indeed, before bestowing a 
loan, the lender in the interests of the saver, inserts some clauses into the loan contract to 
protect savers’ investment. These covenants will enable him to monitor the borrower and 
exercise corporate control if the lender takes part in risky activities conducting to default. 
By taking away the difficulty that outsiders’ savers have to secure their assets, the 
financial system can facilitate the pooling of saving to invest in projects. 
The five functions above relate how financial intermediaries are deeply involved in the 
funding process. The following meanwhile will show how the investments enabled by 
agents such as bank can lower unemployment level. 
In analyzing the relationship between capital investment and unemployment, 
Jósef (2013)10
 
developed a model where labor employed by firms are either dedicated to 
the production of capital or to the production of a final good. Using a cross-country data, 
the results of his quantitative analysis indicated that raising the level of technology to 
produce capital lowers the level of unemployment. In addition, this is due to an 
improvement of the capital formation. The two propositions of the author to explain the 
capital formation are the following: 
Increase in the technology growth rate g increases employment in the 
capital production sector but decreases employment in final-good 
production, partially through reallocation into capital production. Because 
                                                          
10
 Jósef, Sigurdsson. “Capital Investment and Equilibrium Unemployment.” Central Bank of Iceland- 
Working Paper, no. 61, February 2013 
 10 
 
the job creation effect more than offsets the reallocation effect, 
unemployment decreases. 
Increase in the technology growth rate g increases capital formation in 
equilibrium and decreases equilibrium unemployment. 
These findings implies how capital accumulation is conducive for job creation, hence 
unemployment reduction. Consequently, financial intermediaries such as banks become 
the keystone in an economy with low financial market. For, firms within such an 
economy require external capital for their expansion. Such expansion will result into 
employment. 
2.2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
One of the options to tackle the unemployment problem is innovation. The 
concept of innovation develops five channels of innovative ideas through which changes 
in the economy occur (Schumpeter, 1934). There are: the launch of new products, the 
introduction of new production processes, the use of new suppliers, the penetration of 
new markets, and the carrying out of a new organization in the industry.
11
 By 
paraphrasing another point of Schumpeter’s idea, Adil (2011) goes on to say that “the 
new combinations are usually embodied in new productive enterprises which start by 
utilizing the unemployed working people, the unsold raw materials, the new technologies, 
and the unused productive capacity.”12 Moreover, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)13 but 
also Vecchi (1995)
14
 claim also the benefit of innovation on unemployment. They 
                                                          
11
 Schumpeter, Joseph. Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1934. 
Original published, 1912. 
12 
Adil, Mouhammed. “Important Theories of Unemployment and Public Policies.” Journal of Applied 
Business and Economics, no. 12-5(2011): 100-110. 
13 
Mortensen, Dale., and Pissarides, Christopher. “Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of 
Unemployment.” The review of Economic Studies, vol 61, no 3(1994). 397-415. 
14 
Vecchi, Nicole. Entrepreneurs, Institutions and Economic Change: The economics thought of J.A. 
Schumpeter (1905-1925). Translated by Anne J. Stone. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995. 
 11 
 
indicated that through innovation, the level of job creation outbalances the degree of job 
destruction. For Joseph Schumpeter, it is entrepreneurs who are able to come up with 
innovative ideas (Adil, 2011). In Innovation and Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy, 
the author argues that entrepreneurs are likely to be the remedy of joblessness if and only 
if they encounter creativity and innovation in their running business.
15
 Therefore, the 
previous models imply that entrepreneurial activities can tackle unemployment.  
Subsequently, several scholars and organizations will attempt to study the theory 
between entrepreneurship and unemployment, in order to obtain evidence for endorsing 
or not endorsing the model. Thus, the European Commission indicated in 2003 that 
entrepreneurship is a cure for joblessness. Even so, some findings point out the dynamic 
relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship. Indeed, entrepreneurial 
activity can lighten the unemployment burden - “Schumpeter” or pull effect - as 
unemployment can encourage entrepreneurship, which is the push, refugee, or 
shopkeeper effect. Remeikiene and Startiene (2009) asserted that both the pull and push 
effects can be observed in theory and practice.
16
 The study of Ghavidel and others (2011) 
compared developed and developing countries. They concluded that for both countries 
classification, the pull effect is established as a definite but the push effect is not clear.
17
 
In contrast, Audretsch, Carree and Thurik (2001) arrived with different outcomes; their 
investigations allowed them to conclude that entrepreneurship scaled up the level of 
                                                          
15
Innovation and Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy, Accessed July 30, 2014. 
http://druckersociety.at/repository/scientific/Pearl.pdf  
16
 Remeikiene, Rita., and Startiene, Grazina. “Does the Interaction between Entrepreneurship and 
Unemployment Exist?” Economics & Management, no. 14(2009): 903-911. 
17
 Ghavidel, Sahel., Farjadi, G., and Mohammadpour, A. “The Relationship between Entrepreneurship and 
Unemployment in Developed and Developing Countries.” International Journal of Economic Behavior, no. 
1(2011): 71-78. 
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created job.
18
 In addition to Audrey et al, Japan is another evidence of the Schumpeter 
effect, as entrepreneurship lowers unemployment with a lag of four yearly data (Van Stel 
et al, 2007).
19
 
In studies which reveal that entrepreneurs participated deeply in job reduction, 
researchers emphasized on the lack of financial resources as the biggest challenge facing 
these business owners. Their limited capability to raise funds prevents most of them from 
launching their businesses, and growing their companies. In the Schumpeter view, in 
order to materialize innovations, start-ups need credit and finance. Since banks create and 
save money, they are able to redistribute the wealth by lending to entrepreneurs. Kerr and 
Nanda (2011) concluded in line with Schumpeter in Financing Constraints and 
Entrepreneurship that “financing constraints are one of the biggest concerns impacting 
potential entrepreneurs”.20 According to them, entrepreneurs need adequate capital. The 
suggestion arising from the previous authors is that, loans from the banking system are a 
catalyst to launching, running, and sustaining the innovative business of entrepreneurs. 
The prominence of banks in this process is accentuated by Shabbir and others (2012)
21
; 
additionally they give emphasis not only on banks but also on market sector. The 
financial sector includes the market sector as well as the banking sector. Consequently, 
financial sector development appears to be a catalyst of reducing unemployment. 
                                                          
18
 Audretsch, D.B., Carree, M.A., and Thurik, A.R. “Does Entrepreneurship reduce Unemployment?” 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, vol 74, no 30(2001). Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
19
 Van Stel, A.J. and others. “The relationship between Entrepreneurship and Unemployment in Japan.” 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, vol 70, no 30(2007). Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
20
 Kerr, William., and Ramana Nanda. "Financing Constraints and Entrepreneurship." In Handbook of 
Research on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, edited by David Audretsch, Oliver Falck, and Stephan Heblich, 
88–103. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. 
21
 Shabbir, Ghulam and others. “Contribution of Financial Sector Development in Reducing Unemployment 
in Pakistan.” International Journal of Economics and Finance, no. 4-1(2012): 260-268. 
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2.3. INCLUSIVE GROWTH: POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Albeit personal skills and ambition capacities; parental wealth; social status and political 
bonds influence individual economic opportunities; financial development may affect the 
extent to which those economic opportunities are contrasting within poor and rich across 
generation (Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2009). The following literature will discuss how 
the direct mechanism of financial development to the extensive margins and the indirect 
mechanism through labor market lower poverty and inequality. 
2.3.1. Direct mechanism 
Several authors believe that financial development can impact inequality by the 
direct apparatus. This can be done if the financial system tackles the extensive margins: 
eases access to those non-users of financial services impeded for one reason or another. 
Two major challenges that the financial system can help address are human capital 
buildup and investment opportunities. 
Human capital endowment is one of the factors involved in a company’s human 
resources department’s hiring decision. Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2009)22 based on the 
theory of Becker (1979) and Tomes (1986) stress on the fact that finance is a noteworthy 
player in modelling the gap of human capital accrual between rich and poor families. 
Though the production of skilled labors is affected by the dynastic endowment of ability 
and schooling, poor parents face obstacles to develop and invest in the education of their 
children. Therefore, a negative shock toward their wealth along with financial market 
                                                          
22
 Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine. “Finance and Inequality. Theory and Evidence.” Working Paper Series, no. 
4967, June 2009. 
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frictions might lead them to withdraw one child or more children from the educational 
system to child labor.  
In testing the ‘Luxury Axiom’ hypothesis generated by Basu and Van in 1998, 
Ray (2000)
23
 with the household survey data sets of Pakistan has confirmed the above 
assumption. The results implying the relationship between poverty and child schooling 
are the following: “When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, i.e. crosses the poverty 
line from above as defined over non child household income, it significantly and 
substantially increases its children’s involvement in outside, paid employment by 
approximately 500 hours annually for every child, just as the “Luxury Axiom” predicts.” 
Hence, if the financial market allows extensive margin to access their financial services, 
this will lead to more economic growth. Mainly, financial development will enable less 
income households to allocate resource to their children schooling and prevent dropouts, 
which in turn will bridge schooling and job opportunities.  
Beside human capital accumulation, financial development which breaks the 
barriers hindering investment opportunities in the direction of non-wealth societies may 
lessen generational income inequality and poverty. This favors shrinking of 
unemployment rates. Financial development is essential for capital mobilization and 
redistribution in high returns investment project (Levine, 1997).
24
 Nevertheless, when the 
financial system is not efficient enough to obviate risk adverse or moral hazard, 
investment opportunities for talented and innovative spirit are constrained by family 
wealth. For those whose parental assets are at the bottom of the scale, their likelihood to 
                                                          
23
 Ray, Rajan. “Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for 
Peru and Pakistan.” World Bank Economic Review, no. 14-2 (2000): 347-67 
24
 Levine, Ross. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda.” Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol 35, no. 35-2 (1997): 688-726. 
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set up a micro or small venture are undermined and quasi inexistent. As a result, the use 
of financial services becomes their last resort to enter in the labor market through self-
employment.  
In investigating whether access to financial services, particularly credit, lowers 
poverty in Nigeria, Aliero and Ibrahim (2012)
25
 focus on rural areas. Implementing a 
questionnaire randomly distributed in rural areas of Katsina state, they obtained a cross-
sectional primary data. Their findings enabled them to raise the subsequent inference: 
escalating branch facilities in rural areas and easing financial access of poor can reduce 
poverty. This conclusion converges to their literature stating that “The capacity of poor 
for entrepreneurship would be significantly enhanced through the provision of financial 
services to enable them engage in economic activities and be more self-reliant, increase 
employment opportunities, enhance household income thereby leading to economic 
growth.” 
2.3.2. Indirect mechanism 
Out of the direct mechanism, theories suggest that a decline in inequality may also 
be feasible through indirect canals entailing the financial market. In others words, the use 
of financial services by the extensive margin is not the only way to decrease the tenacious 
inequality fissure between the fortunate and unfortunate households. Those excluded 
from the financial system can profit from the economic opportunities and new policy 
implementation.  
                                                          
25
 Aliero, Haruna., and Ibrahim, Saifullahi. “Does Access to Finance Reduce Poverty? Evidence from Katsina 
State.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3-2(2012): 575-581 
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Gine and Townsend (2004)
26
 through their theory of the general equilibrium 
reveal that the greater impact of finance on inequality reduction comes through the 
indirect labor market mechanism. In the long term, financial development will help 
raising the demand for low skilled labor. Moreover the general equilibrium model, 
different authors proved that a modification in a financial institution policy can drive a 
decline in inequality. Among them Beck, Levine and Levkov (2007)
27
. 
For testing the hypothesis that exogenous change in policy in financial sector has 
a negative relationship with inequality; Beck, Levine and Levkov focused on bank 
deregulation. Using the Gini coefficient to measure income inequality, their research 
confirmed the assumption. They found that when a state frees geographical constraints, 
inequality decreases compared to both the state’s previous level of inequality and the 
others state. Furthermore, their findings stress that less than 10% of income inequality 
reduction is due to more entrepreneurial activities backed by loans. Rather, they mention 
that 75% of inequality decline is the result of financial deregulation which 
disproportionately without hurting the rich increases the earnings of low income 
individual. Indeed, this deregulation will lead to increase demand for low skilled workers 
in the labor market.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
                                                          
26
 Giné and Townsend. “Evaluation of Financial Liberalization: A General Equilibrium Model with 
Constrained Occupation Choice.” Journal of Development Economics, 74-2 (2004): 269-307. 
27
 Beck, Thorsten., Levine, Ross., and Levkov, Alexey. “Bid Bad Banks? The Impact of U.S. Branch 
Deregulation on Income Distribution.” Working Paper Series, no. 13299, August 2007. 
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Divided in two parts, the methodology allows the comprehension of the process 
underpinning the hypothesis testing. The first part will display the followed approach 
used to specify the model. The second portion will emphasize on the dataset 
characteristics. 
3.1. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This research aims to pinpoint whether financial development would affect 
unemployment in each of five middle income countries of the Western Africa. It allows 
the study to operate through time series data analysis. Subsequently, the presence or not 
of unit root in the series should be tested; for it will help determining the model to use. 
However to be able to define the model, the length of the lagged variables must be 
identified. Then, others tests will be passed to state whether the model is usable. Finally, 
Granger causality and Impulse Response Function will be initiated to find out if financial 
development would reduce unemployment in those countries.  
3.1.1. Unit root tests 
The preliminary step before identifying the relationship between multiple time 
series is to check their stationary. For running a regression between non-stationary time 
series data leads to spurious result. Checking whether the series are stationaries or not 
imply determining if they have a unit root or not. A series with a unit root is declared 
non-stationary. 
Dicker Fuller and Augmented Dicker Fuller tests are used to determine the 
presence or not of the unit root. The null hypothesis is the presence of unit root. The 
alternative hypothesis confers to the absence of the unit root. A series which is stationary 
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without differentiation is said integrated of order 0, I(0). Then, Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) is the conformist model to estimate some further relationships between the 
variables. 
When the series are stationary with differentiation –integrated of order n– the 
cointegration test must be adopted to establish the existence or not of a long run 
relationship between the variables. At that point, Vector Error Correction Model can be 
used. Others models can be used in time series analysis. 
3.1.2. Test of lag length 
The coefficients and the estimation of the VAR model depend on the number of 
lagged variables. One measure to decide of the lag length in VAR models are information 
criterion. The best model would be the selection of the number (p) of lags that produces 
an information criterion with the smallest value – p<pmax. The Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC), the Bayesian (or Schwarz) information criterion (BIC or SC), or the 
Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) are some measurement of information criteria. 
3.1.3. Vector AutoRegression and model specification 
Once the lag length is settled, the VAR model can be estimated. A VAR is a 
model depicted by various authors as providing a reliable framework to describe data, 
forecast, make structural inference and analyze policy. It is an n-equation, n-variable 
model in which each variable is expressed as a function of its own lagged values and the 
lagged values of the remaining variables. A VAR model of length p is denoted VAR (p). 
Three different forms of VAR can be used: the reduced form, the recursive and the 
structural VAR. This study uses the reduced form. 
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The reduced-VAR structure is that each of the variables is the result of the linear 
function of its own lagged value and the past lagged value of the other variables. OLS 
enables the estimation of each equation. The error terms must be serially uncorrelated; 
they represent the surprise movements in the variables after taking past values into 
account. A VAR of length 1 is estimated as the following: 
Zt = α + βZt-1 + εt 
      
Zt =          Zt-1 =        εt =               β = 
However before making any investigation with VAR model, the estimated model 
with its lag length must satisfied some properties for being quite robust. The model will 
be then diagnosed. Hence, the test of normality, the test of stability and the test of 
correlation must be applied.  
3.1.4. Diagnostic checking: Normality, Stability and Correlation tests 
Three tests will be introduced to analyze the quality of the VAR model. The first 
test will measure how stable the model is. The VAR must satisfy the stability condition. 
For that all the Eigenvalue must lie under the circle: their value must be less than 1. 
The second test will be about checking whether the model presents a serial 
correlation. In order to implement additional tests with a VAR estimated through OLS, 
each equation must satisfy a condition: the residuals of the series must not be correlated. 
To inspect this, the Lagrange multiplier test will be employed. The null hypothesis in this 
test is “no autocorrelation at lagged order” and this null hypothesis must not be rejected 
   X1,t-1 
   X2,t-1 
   ε1,t 
   ε2,t 
   X1,t 
   X2,t 
   β1 
   β2 
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to fulfill the requirement. Hence, the p-value must be greater than the level of 
significance of five percent. 
The third and last test will focus on the normality distribution of the residuals. 
Indeed, with a sample covering limited observations, the residuals may not follow a 
normal distribution. To obviate this uncertainty the normality test of Skewness is adopted. 
Under the null hypothesis the data are normally distributed; thus, if p-value is greater 
than the level of significance (5%), we fail to reject the null hypothesis. And, it matches 
the condition. 
Those three tests will enable examination of two of the three principals’ relationship in a 
VAR model in this research. How time series variables are interlinked in the system of 
equations.  
3.1.5. Granger causality 
One of the three elements than experts try to determine with a VAR model is the causal 
impact of an endogenous variable on another (Brandt and William, 2007).
28
Such an 
analysis elucidates whether a variable X1 is enough explanatory in predicting X2. In order 
to evaluate the causal effect among endogenous variables in a time series analysis, we 
refer to the statistical model of Cliver Granger: the Granger causality concept. 
 Does a time series appropriate in foretelling another time series? This is the 
question that the statistical idea of Granger causality attempt to clear up. Subsequently, 
the following condition must be meet so that X1 will "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") 
X2. The past values of X1 must encompass enough information to better forecast X2 than 
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only the owned past values of X2. The application of Granger causality assumes that the 
analyzed signals are covariance stationary. The null hypothesis of the Granger causality 
states that X1 does not cause X2. If the p-value is greater than the significance level, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
3.1.6. Impulse Response Function 
The second investigation of researchers in VAR models is the dynamic effect begotten by 
the change of one variable to another. Hence, interest will be direct to the impulse 
response functions’ outcomes. Afterward a one unit increase or one standard deviation 
increase in the present value of one of the VAR errors terms, the scope of the impulse 
response function is to figure out the response of the present and forthcoming values of 
each variable. However, it is assumed that the error will subsequently return to zero while 
holding the others errors terms constant. Also, the errors terms must not be correlated 
across equations in the system. 
3.2. DATA 
The data here are clustered in two. Those which are not employed in the regression model 
and the others applied in the estimated model. 
3.2.1. Relation bank-private sector 
One issue raised in this paper is the relation between banks and the private sector 
mainly with small and medium enterprises. Indeed, the previous points of the literature 
mentioned their significance for job creation when they are innovative and not 
constrained by financing. The estimation of banks relationship with firms is a weakness 
in this study. 
 22 
 
Data are punctual, yearly specific to country and are available for one or two 
years. Hence, the data cannot be used for time series regression analysis. Yet some 
variables extracted from the enterprise survey of the International Financial Corporation 
will be used to depict the bank-private sector environment. These are: the percent of firms 
with a bank loan/line of credit, the proportion of loans requiring collateral (%), the value 
of collateral needed for a loan (% of the loan amount), the percent of firms not needing a 
loan, the proportion of investments financed by banks, and the percent of firms 
identifying access to finance as a major constraint. The latest study had been held in 
Ghana in 2013 with a sample of 720 firms. The most recent studies occurred after Ghana 
at year 2009 in Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire; and, respectively accounting 156 and 526 
firms. Concerning Nigeria 1891 firms had been interviewed while 506 firms in Senegal 
506. The surveys had been done in 2007. 
3.2.2. Model variables 
The data of this paper have been extracted from the World Development 
Indicators (2014). They cover the period of 1991 to 2012. Five countries are individually 
examined in this paper. They are Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. 
To find out the questions raised in this research via the Granger causality test and the 
Impulse Response Function, the dependent variable refers to total unemployment in each 
country and the independent variable to financial development. 
In the Western part of Africa, the market sector is fewer developed and expanded 
than the banking sector. Subsequently, this research has focused his choice of indicators 
on the banking sector to come with accurate and best outcomes. Moreover, the 
measurement evaluates the depth of the financial sector. However, numerous indicators 
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of financial deepening are within easy reach. To capture the significance of financial 
development and the best promising variables in specific countries, the research relies on 
two notorious proxies of financial deepening. 
The first proxy of financial depth is the domestic credit to private sector by bank 
as percentage of GDP. In the log form, it is labeled “ldcpsgdp”. Used by countless 
researchers, this measure is centered on investment tailored by banks towards the private 
sector. “Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided 
to the private sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except 
central banks), such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment”. 
The second proxy is the comprehensive measure of financial depth, money in 
circulation, M3. Also named liquid liability, it is calculated as a percentage of the 
country’s GDP and include all financial institutions.  Liquid liabilities are “the sum of 
currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic 
currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, 
certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, 
foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market 
funds held by residents”. This indicator is branded in his log form as “llqlygdp”. 
The first proxy, for directed the engine of development namely the private sector, has 
been estimated revelatory than the broadest measure of money in circulation by several 
researchers.  However, liquid liabilities is also meaningful to the extent that the 
underprivileged can access to finance outside the financial zone. 
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With reference to unemployment, it is defined as the share of the labor force that 
is without work but available for and seeking employment (WDI, 2014). The data have 
been compiled in the log form and labeled “luntotal”. The summary of the statistics are in 
the following table 1. 
Table 1: Data Description 
Countries Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Country 1 
Capo Verde 
Unemployment, total 7.89 0.12 7.60 8.10 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) 35.69 17.22 4.45 65.28 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 68.60 13.12 34.91 87.74 
Country 2 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Unemployment, total 4.44 0.77 4.00 6.70 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) 18.13 5.85 13.45 35.60 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 26.89 4.57 21.68 38.37 
Country 3 
Ghana 
Unemployment, total 6.09 2.68 3.20 10.40 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) 10.84 4.16 3.66 15.83 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 26.20 5.03 15.56 34.11 
Country 4 
Nigeria 
Unemployment, total 7.55 0.09 7.40 7.70 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) 15.32 7.42 8.95 38.35 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 22.69 6.60 13.23 40.77 
Country 5 
Senegal 
Unemployment, total 9.96 0.06 9.90 10.10 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) 21.18 4.75 14.60 29.85 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 28.87 7.28 20.59 40.39 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. PRELIMINARY RESULTS: PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACCESS TO 
FINANCE 
The outcomes from the enterprise survey tell how much firms are constrained by the 
banking sector in their respective countries. The  whole pinpoint figures in the below 
analyses are inserted in the appendix A for Cape Verde, appendix B for Cote d’Ivoire, 
appendix C for Ghana, appendix D for Nigeria and appendix E for Senegal. 
4.1.1. Cape Verde 
In Cape Verde, 33.1% of small enterprises identified access to finance as a major 
constraint for their business running. This figure is not as much of medium and large 
enterprises which are respectively estimated at 45.1% and 57.4%. Even though it seems 
like fewer Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) do not require funding to 
flourish, evidences show that they are disadvantaged when they aspire to bank’s lending. 
Indeed, the collateral needed for a loan as a percentage of the loan amount is higher for 
small enterprises, 201.2%. However, large and medium companies must respectively 
guarantee 161.3% and 137.2%; although the value of the guarantee is for all firms above 
the requested amount of loan. This could explain why the proportion of investment 
financed by banks in Cape Verde is larger for medium enterprises (41%).  
4.1.2. Cote d’Ivoire 
Access to finance in Cote d’Ivoire differs from Cape Verde. It is rather a greater 
share of SMEs which acknowledged access to finance as a main restriction in the 
business running: small companies accounted for 66.4% while medium companies, 
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73.3%; and large companies, 45.4%. Subsequently, more SMEs have stated their 
necessity of external financing albeit their proportion of loan requiring collateral (30.4%) 
is 39% lower than those of the medium and large companies. Certainly other features of 
SMEs in Cote d’Ivoire hinder their access to finance. Their proportion of loan or line of 
credit is smaller than the large companies. Ten percent of small businesses are been 
conferred a loan or a credit line, 15.9% the medium businesses and 37.4% of large 
businesses. 
4.1.3. Ghana 
The 2013’s Ghana findings are more truthful of the current environment between 
the banking system and the private sector. Inside it, it is about 51% of large Ghanaian 
firms which are bestowed of a loan or a credit line. However, it is around 20% of SMEs 
which can profit of this financial service. Also, despite the fact that large firms face 
higher proportion of loans requiring collateral, the survey conclusions reveal that they 
grant less value of collateral compare to SMEs. Nonetheless, the proportion of collateral 
required for a loan is very high. As in Cape Verde in 2009, the percentage of collateral 
goes over 200% of the loan value. However, it is smaller for large firms. Subsequently, 
small and medium firms identified access to finance as a major constraint to run their 
companies. 
4.1.4. Nigeria 
As in previous countries’ analysis, fewer large firms complain about the access to 
finance as a major handicap to their businesses in Nigeria. In the survey of 2007, only 
13.2% of large firms identified access to finance as their constraint against 59.3% of 
small firms. Despite the above-mentioned, few portion of companies profited of loan or 
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credit line. About 14.2% of large companies accessed to this financial service while 2.9% 
of small companies and 5.8% of medium companies profited of it. In addition, secure the 
loan recommended a share of collateral between 71 and 83% of the requested loan. 
4.1.5. Senegal 
Large and small firms are almost proportionally unanimous in declaring access to 
finance as a key impeding the business running in Senegal. Indeed, 51.6 % of the smaller 
companies and 54.5% of larger firms agree to this fact while 54.5% for while 34.1% for 
the medium enterprises. However, large businesses are better off in accessing loan. Fifty 
five of them obtained a line of credit, but only 10% of small businesses and 28% of 
medium ones have contracted this financial service.  
The analysis of the banking lending system concludes that unlike to large firms, fewer 
SMEs can access to finance. In addition, within the majority of countries, the magnitude 
of SMEs mentioning they do not need a loan is smaller than the volume of large firms 
touching on the same idea. However more than twice of this aforementioned volume of 
SMEs acknowledged access to finance to finance as a main constraint to their 
enhancement. The excessive value of collateral could be the impediment of SMEs. 
Obstacles such as the business’s management, technological innovation can also prevent 
SMEs to rely on external financing. Indeed, the improvement of businessmen managerial 
skills is relevant especially when it remains a buzzword in the sampled countries. 
Moreover, the commercial banks available within these countries fear the unpredictability 
of innovation. 
4.2. FORMAL TEST FINDINGS 
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4.2.1. Unit root results 
The table 2 displays the findings of the unit root test. Excepting liquid liabilities as 
percentage of GDP in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire, all variables are declared stationary of 
order 0. As to M3, there are stationary at first difference. The model specification can 
then be completed via the Vector Auto Regression model. 
Table 2: Unit Root Estimation 
Countries Variables Level Difference 
Country 1 
Capo Verde 
Unemployment, total -2.036**   
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
-3.386**   
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 
-4.275***   
Country 2 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Unemployment, total -1.919**   
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
-3.592**   
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 
-5.31  -6.406*** 
Country 3 
Ghana 
Unemployment, total -2.131**   
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
-2.212**   
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 
-2.734***   
Country 4 
Nigeria 
Unemployment, total -1.949**   
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
-2.266**   
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 
-2.258**   
Country 5 
Senegal 
Unemployment, total -3.894**   
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
-9.576***   
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP 
-0.424 -3.794*** 
This table presents the results of unit-root estimation at level and 1
st
 difference. Note: ***, ** and * 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
4.2.2. Cape Verde 
4.2.2.1. Domestic credit to private sector  
 Diagnostic results 
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After issuing the test of lag length with the independent variable –domestic credit to 
private sector, the results have recommended a 3-years length. The diagnosis of the 
model shows that the Granger causality and the forecasting tests can be implemented. 
Indeed, the model satisfies the stability condition, all the eigenvalue are less than 1, then 
lies under the circle (table 3). Moreover, there is no serial correlation in the VAR model 
as a whole. At lag 1 and 2, both p-value of 0.838 and 0.845 are greater than the 5% level 
of significance. Then, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected (table 4). 
Finally, the residuals of the model are normally distributed; p-value of approximately 
0.13 (table 5) is greater than 0.05; and null hypothesis stating that residuals are normally 
distributed fails to be rejected. Our VAR model has passed the diagnosis checking. 
Table 3: Eigenvalue Stability Test's Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.9277321 
 
0.927732 
-0.7236781 
 
0.723678 
0.4068282 + .3643967i 0.546163 
0.4068282 -  .3643967i 0.546163 
0.2994445 
 
0.299445 
0.00269814 
 
0.002698 
 
Table 4: Lagrange-multiplier Test's Result in Cape Verde: Proxy 1 
lag chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
1 1.4346 4 0.83815 
2 1.3903 4 0.84589 
H0: no autocorrelation at lag order 
Table 5: Skewness Test’s Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 1  
Equation Skewness chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
Luntotal -0.23996 0.182 1 0.66937 
lpcreditgdp -1.1106 3.906 1 0.04812 
ALL 
 
4.088 2 0.12949 
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 Granger causality 
Table 6: Results from Granger Causality Wald in Cape Verde: Proxy 1  
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal ldcpsgdp 29.009 3 0.000 
luntotal ALL 29.009 3 0.000 
 
With lag of 3, p-value of 0.000 < 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected. Then, the indicator 
of financial development Granger causes unemployment in Cape Verde. 
 Impulse Response Function  
An unexpected increase of 1% domestic credit to private sector will affect unemployment 
in Cape Verde the first, second and third year. The effect will be a reduction of 
unemployment by 0.4%, 0.58% and 0.56% respectively. As shown in the graph from the 
fourth year the results are not significant. Indeed, looking at the vertical axis, the 
confidence interval (CI) would have not include zero for concluding results. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Graph in Cape Verde with the Proxy 1 
 
Table 7: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cape Verde: Proxy 1  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.004046 -0.006217 -0.001876 
2 -0.005823 -0.009131 -0.002515 
3 -0.005615 -0.010001 -0.001229 
4 -0.004608 -0.009391 0.000175 
5 -0.003732 -0.008897 0.001434 
6 -0.003161 -0.009096 0.002774 
7 -0.002868 -0.009765 0.004029 
8 -0.002682 -0.01037 0.005006 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
 (1) impulse = ldcpsgdp, and response = luntotal 
 
4.2.2.2. Liquid liabilities 
 Diagnostic findings  
Unlike to domestic credit to private sector, the model containing liquid liability is 
advocated to maintain a length of one year for the lagged variables. Similarly to the 
-.01
-.005
0
.005
0 2 4 6 8
irfcv, lpcreditgdp, luntotal
95% CI orthogonalized irf
step
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previous model with a different indicator of financial development, this one has passed 
the diagnosis checking. Firstly, the VAR model satisfies the stability condition (table 8). 
Secondly, the Lagrange-multiplier test reveals a no serial correlation within the model at 
lag 1 and 2. At lag 1, the p-value of 0.28 and is greater than 0.05, the level of significance. 
At lag 2 the p-value is also greater than the level of significance (table 9). Then, we failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Thirdly, the residuals within the 
VAR are normally distributed. Indeed, both p-value via the Skewness test are greater than 
5% (table 10). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 8: Eigenvalue Stability Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2  
                                 Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.8808248 
 
0.8808248 
0.7827224 
 
0.7827224 
Table 9: Lagrange-multiplier Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2  
lag  chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
1 5.0584 4 0.28136 
2 0.3509 4 0.98630 
Table 10: Skewness Test Results in Cape Verde: Proxy 2  
Equation   Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal -0.19401 0.132 1 0.87118 
llqlygdp 0.43362 0.658 1 0.51414 
ALL 
 
0.79 2 0.79775 
 
 Granger causality 
The conclusions brought about by the table 11 refute the probability that liquid liabilities 
in Cape Verde Granger cause unemployment. The probability value is greater than 5%. 
Table 11: Results from Granger Causality Wald tests in Cape Verde: Proxy 2  
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Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal llqlygdp 0.2388 1 0.625 
luntotal ALL 0.2388 1 0.625 
 
 Impulse Response Function 
In the next 8 years, any 1% positive change in liquid liabilities in Cape Verde will not 
have any impact on unemployment. 
 
Figure 2: Impulse Response Graph in Cape Verde with the Proxy 2 
Table 12: Results from Impulse Response Function  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.000271 -0.00136 0.000819 
2 -0.000451 -0.002221 0.00132 
3 -0.000563 -0.002715 0.001589 
4 -0.000626 -0.002947 0.001695 
5 -0.000653 -0.002995 0.00169 
6 -0.000655 -0.002921 0.001612 
7 -0.000639 -0.002769 0.001491 
8 -0.000612 -0.002573 0.0013 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = ldcpsgdp, and response = luntotal 
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Looking at different lag period, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP 
has been proven to be the most appropriate indicator to lessen unemployment rate in 
Cape Verde. Thus, the argument of Schumpeter can be valid in this country. Banks can 
favor the falling of unemployment by granting loans to SMEs and entrepreneurs. In the 
2009 enterprise survey of Cape Verde, there are more medium firms wishing to finance 
their investments through the banks.  
 
4.2.3. Cote d’Ivoire 
4.2.3.1. Domestic credit to private sector 
 Diagnostic findings 
At the recommended 4 years of lagged variables with the second proxy in Cote d’Ivoire, 
the VAR model satisfies the three diagnostic tests enumerated in the methodology step. 
Table 13 shows that the model fulfills the stability condition. The Lagrange-multiplier 
findings in the table 14 reports that there is no serial correlation in the VAR model at lag 
1 and 2. Both p-values are greater than the level of significance which is 5%. Hence the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. The table 15 tells us that the residuals are normally 
distributed in the model. 
Table 13: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.824262 +   .353144i 0.896727 
0.824262 -0.3531144i 0.896727 
-0.4098971 +0.5867237i 0.715724 
-0.4098971 +0.5867237i 0.715724 
0.396185 
 
0.396185 
-0.01282371 +0.3702517i 0.370474 
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-0.01282371 +0.3702517i 0.370474 
0.353332 
 
0.353332 
Table 14: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 1  
lag  chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 4.2316 4 0.37557 
2 0.9917 4 0.91105 
Table 15: Skewness Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1  
Equation   Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.40794 0.499 1 0.47983 
ldcpsgdp -0.19534 0.114 1 0.7351 
ALL 
 
0.614 2 0.73575 
 Granger causality  
Table 16: Results from Granger Causality Wald tests in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 1 
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal ldcpsgdp 77.246 4 0.000 
luntotal ALL 77.246 4 0.000 
Within the VAR model of four years of lagged variables, domestic credit to private sector 
by banks has a causal effect on total unemployment in Cote d’Ivoire. Indeed, the null 
hypothesis is rejected since p-value in the above table 16 is less than 0.05. 
 Impulse Response Function  
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Graph in Cote d'Ivoire with the Proxy 1 
 
 
 
Table 17: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 1 
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.004414 -0.006599 -0.002228 
2 -0.004426 -0.007307 -0.001546 
3 -0.003301 -0.006564 -0.000039 
4 -0.001779 -0.00543 0.001873 
5 -0.000649 -0.004819 0.003521 
6 0.000608 -0.004054 0.005271 
7 0.00154 -0.003387 0.006467 
8 0.001947 -0.002813 0.006706 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
 (1) impulse = lpcreditgdp, and response = luntotal 
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The results issued from the previous table reports that in the next three years a positive 
shock on domestic credit to private sector will reduce unemployment rate in Cote 
d’Ivoire. At year 1 and 2, the decline will be of 0.4% each. At the third year a drop of 
0.33% will be perceived. 
4.2.3.2. Liquid liabilities 
 Diagnostic findings  
The present model covering 2 years of lagged values has passed the diagnostic checking. 
Indeed, the model is stable. There is no serial correlation in the model at lag 2 (table 19). 
Besides that, the model as a whole encompasses normally distributed residuals. At 5% of 
significance level, the p-value of 0.064 (table 29) is greater than 0.005, hence the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
Table 18: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.3907659 
 
0.390766 
-0.2519854 +0.2219238i 0.335778 
-0.2519854 -0.2219238i 0.335778 
0.3088098 -  .3643967i 0.30881 
 
Table 19: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2  
Lag chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 38.5437 4 0.00000 
2 1.7282 4 0.78560 
Table 20: Skewness Results in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 2 
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal -1.3063 5.404 1 0.02009 
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dllqlygdp -0.16197 0.083 1 0.77317 
ALL 
 
5.487 2 0.06434 
 
 Granger causality  
The yearly change of liquid liabilities does not Granger cause total unemployment in 
Cote d’Ivoire. As demonstrated through the Granger causality Wald tests within the 21st 
table, p-value is greater than 0.05. Consequently, we failed to reject the null hypothesis.  
Table 21: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Cote d'Ivoire: Proxy 2 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal dllqlygdp 0.23388 2 0.890 
luntotal ALL 0.23388 2 0.890 
 Impulse Response Function 
In the eight coming years, even though liquid liabilities face a shock in Cote d’Ivoire, this 
will not cause any statistically significant change in unemployment. A one percent rising 
of financial development will have no incidence of unemployment rate (table 22). 
 
Figure 4: Impulse Response Graph in Cote d'Ivoire with the Proxy 2 
Table 22: Results from Impulse Response Function in Cote d’Ivoire: Proxy 2 
Step (1) (1) (1) 
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Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
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oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.001827 -0.018122 0.014467 
2 -0.002628 -0.015186 0.020443 
3 0.000296 -0.004615 0.005208 
4 0.000338 -0.003153 0.003829 
5 0.000174 -0.001508 0.001856 
6 0.000044 -0.000427 0.000515 
7 0.000031 -0.000251 0.000313 
8 9.90E-06 -0.000072 0.000092 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = dllqlygdp, and response = luntotal 
In Cote d’Ivoire, scale up the level of domestic credit to the private sector is the 
appropriate instrument to decrease unemployment level. This variable Granger causes 
unemployment but also if raising up by 1% the level of unemployment will fall. 
4.2.4. Ghana 
4.2.4.1. Domestic credit to private sector 
 Diagnostic findings  
In the Ghana example, the VAR model with the proxy of domestic credit to private sector 
as a percentage of GDP has passed the three tests of diagnostic. The lagged variables 
have a length of one year in the model. Model meeting the stability condition, since all 
the eigenvalues in the table 23 are less than 1. Furthermore there is no serial correlation 
in the VAR. The probability values resulting of the Lagrange-multiplier test at lag 1 and 2 
are higher than the 5% percent of significance level; then, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. Finally, the test of Skewness (table 25) testifies of the normality of the residuals 
in the VAR. 
Table 23: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Ghana: Proxy 1  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
         0.8404158 
 
0.8404160 
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         0.5795794 
 
0.5795790 
Table 24: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Ghana: Proxy 1  
lag  chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 5.2019 4 0.2672 
2 4.8617 4 0.30178 
Table 25: Skewness Results in Ghana: Proxy 1  
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.52329 0.958 1 0.32759 
ldcpsgdp -0.40459 0.573 1 0.44909 
ALL 
 
1.531 2 0.46502 
 Granger causality 
With just one year of past values recommended within this model, the test of causality 
viewing from Granger has been revealed negative. The causal relationship from our 
proxy of financial development – domestic credit to private sector – to unemployment 
does not exit. The findings in the table 26 prove it; the p-value of 0.433 is superior to the 
level of significance 0.05. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis stating that 
ldcpsgdp does not Granger cause unemployment. 
Table 26: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Ghana: Proxy 1  
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal ldcpsgdp 0.61542 1 0.433 
luntotal ALL 0.61542 1 0.433 
 Impulse Response Function 
At a one percent shock on domestic credit to private sector, unemployment eight years 
forecasting of unemployment unveils the null effect of the increase in Ghana. Indeed, 
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even if the below graph show a decreasing of unemployment, the results are not 
statistically significant. 
 
Figure 5: Impulse Response Graph in Ghana with the Proxy 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Results from Impulse Response Function in Ghana: Proxy 1  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.01808 -0.063564 0.027413 
2 -0.02567 -0.089146 0.040182 
3 -0.02764 -0.095466 0.040182 
4 -0.02675 -0.092288 0.038788 
5 -0.02452 -0.084762 0.03572 
6 -0.02179 -0.075618 0.032038 
7 -0.018997 -0.066284 0.028289 
8 -0.016363 -0.057474 0.024748 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
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(1) impulse = ldcpsgdp, and response = luntotal 
4.2.4.2. Liquid liabilities 
 Diagnostic findings  
The choice of past values in this model lead to four-years lagged variables models with 
the proxy 2 of financial development that is liquid liabilities. After running the regression, 
the model has passed the checking. Firstly, the stability condition for the model is 
satisfied. Secondly, the VAR model does not include any serial correlation as 
demonstrated within the outcomes of the Lagrange-Multiplier test of the table 29. Thirdly, 
the residuals are normally distributed in the model; the probability values for each single 
variable and for both are greater than the level of significance of 5 percent (table 30). 
Table 28: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Ghana: Proxy 2  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.997342 
 
0.997342 
-0.54305 +  .6659888i 0.859326 
-0.54305 -  .6659888i 0.859326 
-0.33656 +  .7558163i 0.827364 
-0.33656 -  .7558163i 0.827364 
0.645013 +  .4755581i 0.801372 
0.645013 -  .4755581i 0.801372 
0.608052 
 
0.608052 
 
Table 29: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Ghana: Proxy 2  
Lag chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 4.8327 4 0.30489 
2 2.5164 4 0.64169 
Table 30: Skewness Results in Ghana: Proxy 2  
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal -0.35889 0.386 1 0.5342 
llqlygdp -0.59677 1.068 1 0.30131 
ALL 
 
1.455 2 0.48316 
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 Granger causality 
The Granger causality test proves that there is a causal link between the two variables 
from liquid liability to unemployment with the four lagged variables. Indeed, the null 
hypothesis is rejected since p-value is inferior to the five percent level of significance. 
Table 31: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Ghana: proxy 2  
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal llqlygdp 10.094 4 0.039 
luntotal ALL 10.094 4 0.039 
 Impulse Response Function in Ghana: proxy 2 
With the results of the impulse response function, it is possible to improve the situation of 
jobseekers in Ghana. This can be done by raising the level of liquid liabilities. Indeed, 
with a one percent intensification of liquid liabilities at present year, the forthcoming 
third and fourth year will spot a dropping of unemployment respectively by 0.2% and 
0.09%. Beside this, another shrinking of unemployment will occur at the sixth year (table 
32). These results are statistically significant. 
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Graph in Ghana with the Proxy 2 
Table 32: Results from Impulse Response Function in Ghana: proxy 2  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.04252 -0.11876 0.033725 
2 -0.04798 -0.13036 0.034391 
3 -0.09831 -0.17617 -0.02045 
4 -0.08969 -0.17019 -0.00919 
5 -0.05734 -0.13586 0.021173 
6 -0.08984 -0.1769 -0.00278 
7 -0.05882 -0.13885 0.021219 
8 -0.03622 -0.11308 0.04065 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = llqlygdp, and response = luntotal 
The findings in Ghana differ from our previous countries. It is rather the comprehensive 
money supply which can give a hand in unemployment decreasing. Domestic credit to 
private sector even if increasing by 1% would not be able to negatively affect the 
unemployment rate. The value of domestic credit as a percentage of GDP has reached is 
highest value of 14% in 2012. Besides, fewer SMEs can access to a bank loan as the large 
firms. 
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4.2.5. Nigeria 
4.2.5.1. Domestic credit to private sector 
 Diagnostic findings  
In determining how many years of lagged variables will tie to the Nigeria’s VAR model 
with domestic credit to private sector, 1 year of lagged value is recommended. Therefore 
proceeding to the model analysis points out the stability of the model since all the 
Eigenvalue lie under the circle. There values are lower than 1 (table 33). Moreover, the 
model does not include a serial correlation. The p-value inside the 34
th
 table representing 
the Lagrange-multiplier test is superior to the significance level. Lastly, the residuals are 
normally distributed as exposed within the 35
th
 table – the Skewness test results. Hence 
the model has handled the diagnosis checking. 
Table 33: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.779435 
 
0.779435 
0.475403 
 
0.475403 
Table 34: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1 
Lag chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 6.4394 4 0.16865 
2 4.3647 4 0.3589 
Table 35: Skewness Results in Nigeria: Proxy 1  
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.79714 2.224 1 0.13588 
ldcpsgdp 0.45514 0.725 1 0.39449 
ALL 
 
2.949 2 0.22889 
 Granger causality  
In testing the causal relationship’s hypothesis from domestic credit to private sector as 
percentage of GDP to unemployment, the Granger causality brought about a no causal 
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link between the variables at one year of past values. The p-value of 0.189 is greater than 
0.05. We hence failed to reject the null hypothesis specifying that ldcpsgdp does not 
cause unemployment.  
Table 36: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Nigeria: Proxy 1  
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal ldcpsgdp 1.7247 1 0.189 
luntotal ALL 1.7247 1 0.189 
 
 Impulse Response Function 
With a shock on domestic credit to private sector, this will not impact unemployment 
level within Nigeria in the eight coming years. Indeed, even though the graph shows an 
upshifting then a decrease in unemployment rate, those results are not statistically 
significant. The band of the confidence interval includes zero from the ordinate axis of 
the Impulse Response Function. 
 
Figure 7: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 1 
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Table 37: Results from Impulse Response Function in Nigeria: Proxy 1  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 0.001485 -0.00078 0.003745 
2 0.001863 -0.00084 0.004567 
3 0.001788 -0.00084 0.004418 
4 0.001553 -0.00087 0.003973 
5 0.001286 -0.00089 0.003461 
6 0.001039 -0.00089 0.002965 
7 0.000827 -0.00086 0.002515 
8 0.000652 -0.00082 0.00212 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = ldcpsgdp, and response = luntotal 
 
4.2.5.2. Liquid liabilities 
 Diagnostic findings  
Unlike the above model with domestic credit to private sector, the actual model includes 
4 years of lagged variables. However, it satisfies the three checking test. Indeed, each of 
the eigenvalue lies under the circle, the different values are less than 1. Besides, there is 
no serial correlation within model. It is noticed in the table 39 that the p-values are above 
the level of significance. Hence, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  To end, the results of 
normality test displays inside the table 40 demonstrate that the residuals are normally 
distributed. Subsequently, the hypotheses of this research can be tested for Nigeria with 
this second proxy of financial development. 
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Table 38: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.555524 +  .7282245i 0.915925 
0.555524 -  .7282245i 0.915925 
0.844898 +  .2997966i 0.89651 
0.844898 -  .2997966i 0.89651 
-0.7349 +  .2408845i 0.773374 
-0.7349 -  .2408845i 0.773374 
-0.34695 +  .6674066i 0.752203 
-0.34695 -  .6674066i 0.752203 
Table 39: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2  
lag chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
1 5.7697 4 0.21702 
2 2.7524 4 0.60008 
Table 40: Skewness Results in Nigeria: Proxy 2  
Equation Skewness chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.01952 0.001 1 0.97304 
llqlygdp 0.04376 0.006 1 0.93958 
ALL 
 
0.007 2 0.99656 
 Granger causality 
In the table below, it is clearly proven than liquid liabilities in the model affects total 
unemployment in Nigeria. The table 41 discloses a p-value of 0.000 which is greater than 
the level of significance.  Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected and llqlygdp Granger 
causes luntotal.   
Table 41: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Nigeria: Proxy 2  
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal llqlygdp 21.926 4 0.000 
luntotal ALL 21.926 4 0.000 
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 Impulse Response Function 
The previous test found a causal relationship between the both variables. However, a 
shock on liquid liabilities is more specific about the quality of the bound. Indeed, by 
rising financial development by one percent, unemployment will be reduced in Nigeria at 
the sixth year by 0.03% (table 42).  
 
Figure 8: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 2 
Table 42: Results from Impulse Response Function in Nigeria: Proxy 2  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -9.70E-06 -0.00157 0.001553 
2 0.000952 -0.00069 0.002596 
3 0.001004 -0.001003 0.00301 
4 -0.00195 -0.00418 0.000274 
5 -0.0013 -0.0029 0.000297 
6 -0.00216 -0.003996 -0.000328 
7 -0.001061 -0.002799 0.000676 
8 -0.000118 -0.001643 0.001407 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = llqlygdp, and response = luntotal 
-.004
-.002
0
.002
.004
0 2 4 6 8
irfnig, llqlygdp, luntotal
95% CI orthogonalized irf
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
 50 
 
The findings of Nigeria have identified only M3/GDP as the indicator to reduce 
unemployment rate in Nigeria. The enterprise survey of 2007 may contribute in 
explaining this outcome since it shows that access to finance was lower in Nigeria. 
Fourteen percent of large firms contracted a loan while 2.9% and 5.8% of small and 
medium firms obtained this opportunity. To add, the SMEs complained about their 
financing difficulty. 
4.2.6. Senegal 
4.2.6.1. Domestic credit to private sector 
 Diagnostic findings  
The determination of the lag length had led to 4 years of lagged variables in this VAR 
model. The model has passed the three test recommended to investigate the hypotheses of 
this research. The eigenvalue being less than one in the 43
rd
 table, the model is stable. 
Following this, the 44
th
 table specifies that the model does not contain any serial 
correlation. And, in the 45
th
 table, the residuals have been found normally distributed. 
Table 43: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Senegal: Proxy 1  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.4955527 +  .8226881i 0.960410 
0.4955527 +  .8226881i 0.960410 
0.8394558 
 
0.8394560 
0.7777479 
 
0.7777480 
-0.6383158 0.3347275i 0.7207560 
-0.6383158 0.3347275i 0.7207560 
-0.1404934 +  .6721047i 0.6866320 
-0.1404934 +  .6721047i 0.6866320 
Table 44: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Senegal: Proxy 1  
lag chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
1 5.4294 4 0.24601 
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2 2.4067 4 0.66142 
Table 45: Skewness Results in Senegal: Proxy 1  
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.59971 1.079 1 0.29893 
ldcpsgdp 0.62575 1.175 1 0.27844 
ALL 
 
2.254 2 0.32406 
 
 Granger causality 
The four lagged variables model indicates that there is no “cause-effect” from domestic 
credit to private sector to total unemployment. Indeed, the table 46 points out a p-value 
greater than 5% level of significance. This allows a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Table 46: Results from Granger Causality Wald Tests in Senegal: Proxy 1  
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal ldcpsgdp 5.8943 4 0.207 
luntotal ALL 5.8943 4 0.207 
 
 Impulse Response Function 
In aiming to determine whether domestic credit to private sector in Senegal can affect the 
level unemployment, the impulse response function has given the answer. By a 1% 
amplification of domestic credit at year 0, no positive or negative effect will be detected 
over the 8 coming years with unemployment rate. 
 52 
 
 
Figure 9: Impulse Response Graph in Nigeria with the Proxy 1 
Table 47: Results from Impulse Response Function in Senegal: Proxy 1  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 0.000346 -0.000323 0.001015 
2 -0.000506 -0.001142 0.00013 
3 -0.000558 -0.001213 0.000097 
4 -0.000011 -0.000577 0.000556 
5 0.000318 -0.000274 0.00091 
6 0.00036 -0.000232 0.000953 
7 0.000046 -0.000444 0.000536 
8 -0.000229 -0.000731 0.000273 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1)  impulse = ldcpsgdp, and response = luntotal 
 
4.2.6.2. Liquid liabilities  
 Diagnostic findings  
In the case of liquid liabilities in Senegal the variables are at first difference level. They 
represent the percentage change of liquid liabilities from one year to the succeeding one. 
The length of lag values recommended for this model is four years. From the stability, 
Lagrange-multiplier and Skewness’s tests, the model has passed the checking. Indeed, the 
-.001
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0
.0005
.001
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irfsen, lpcreditgdp, luntotal
95% CI orthogonalized irf
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Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
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model is stable (table 48). It does not encompass a serial correlation (table 49). Then, the 
residuals are normally distributed (table 50).  
Table 48: Eigenvalue Stability Results in Senegal: Proxy 2  
Eigenvalue Modulus 
0.065699 +0.1484478i 0.162336 
0.065699 +0.1484478i 0.162336 
Table 49: Lagrange-multiplier Results in Senegal: Proxy 2  
Lag chi2 Df Prob > chi2 
1 3.7498 4 0.44093 
2 0.9415 4 0.91854 
Table 50: Skewness Results in Senegal: Proxy 2  
Equation Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal 0.48081 0.771 1 0.38003 
dllqlygdp -0.55427 1.024 1 0.31156 
ALL 
 
1.795 2 0.40766 
 Granger causality 
As for the first proxy of financial development, liquid liabilities do not Granger-cause 
unemployment rate in Nigeria. The p-value issued within the Granger causality Wald test 
is greater than the 5% level of significance. 
Table 51: Results Granger Causality Wald Tests in Senegal: Proxy 2  
Equation   Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
luntotal dllqlygdp 1.2138 1 0.271 
luntotal ALL 1.2138 1 0.271 
 Impulse Response Function 
In order to know whether liquid liabilities would impact unemployment, the impulse 
response outcomes do not reveal a statistically significant impact in the 8 coming years. 
Indeed, escalating liquid liabilities by one percent will not affect unemployment rate. 
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Graph in Senegal with the Proxy 2 
Table 52: Results from Impulse Response Function in Senegal: Proxy 2  
Step 
(1) (1) (1) 
Oirf Lower Upper 
0 0 0 0 
1 -0.00136 -0.003817 0.001096 
2 -0.00018 -0.001073 0.000715 
3 0.000012 -0.00025 0.000275 
4 6.30E-06 -0.000053 0.000066 
5 5.10E-07 -9.20E-06 0.00001 
6 -1.00E-07 -2.60E-06 2.40E-06 
7 -2.70E-08 -4.70E-07 4.20E-07 
8 -8.40E-10 -7.00E-08 6.90E-08 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) impulse = dllqlygdp, and response = luntotal 
The two proxies of financial development have no causal link with unemployment rate. 
Moreover, scaling up their share as percentage of GDP would not be inductive to 
minimize unemployment level in Senegal. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Financial development has been prescribed as a relevant tool to foster inclusive 
economic growth. However, the majority of investigators who have tested this hypothesis 
have focused on whether financial development can reduce inequality and poverty. Their 
researches are either country-specific, grasped by economy level or regional. Depending 
on the region, the economy, the choice of variable and the value of indicator their 
findings are either positive or negative. In spite of the fact that poverty, inequality and 
unemployment are linked, few scholars studied the impact of financial development on 
unemployment. Though, the review of the literature explains how financial development 
could foster job creation.  
Reviewing many scholarly works has led to the particularity of a developed 
financial system in producing unemployment reduction in every economy via diverse 
ways. For this purpose, the channels conducting to this specific aftermath of the financial 
development have been grouped into three. All three channels rely on the ability of the 
financial system to lower the costs of generating, mobilizing and pooling saving in order 
to finance productive investment (Levine, 1997). To add to the aforementioned 
requirement, if only the wealthier, the educated, and those politically connected access to 
capital, this will not rise job opportunities. 
Indeed, when the banking system can allow capital accumulation, the firms 
requiring external capital would expand their businesses; hence job creation. Capital 
accumulation is the first channel to decrease unemployment level in a country. Beside 
this channel, entrepreneurship is the second channel proposed by Schumpeter (1934) and 
others scholars. Studies reveal that entrepreneurs participate deeply in job reduction but 
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those business owners lack of financial resources to start up or grow up their companies. 
The last channel is via the reduction of poverty and inequality. Financial development 
affects the extent to which economic opportunities contrast between rich and poor. 
Actually financial development can allow the extensive margins to use the financial 
services. Moreover, the excluded can profit of the rising demand for low skilled labor and 
new policy implementation. This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by 
conducting an empirical research for five middle income countries of the western Africa. 
To elucidate the questions raised in this paper, two groups of data have been 
collected. The first data are from the enterprise survey of the International Financial 
Corporation and cover a period which is specific to each country. Those data portray the 
relation and the aftermaths of the private sector with banks in accessing loans. The 
second type of data was drawn up from the World Development Indicators (2014). They 
are spread over the period 1991-2012. Unemployment rate is the dependent variable 
whereas liquid liabilities (% of GDP) and domestic credit to private sector by banks (% 
of GDP) the proxies of financial development, the independent variable. The main 
objectives was to determine whether financial Granger-causes unemployment in each 
country but also whether in the long run an increase of financial development can lower 
unemployment. 
With the empirical findings, the variables are stationary of order 0 except liquid 
liabilities in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal; with the same Dicker fuller test they are 
stationary at first difference. The causal relationship from domestic credit to private 
sector is proven in two countries Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire. In those countries, it is 
demonstrated that at the impulse of the proportion of domestic credit to private sector as 
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percentage of GDP, unemployment will fall in the first three years for both economies. In 
Ghana and Nigeria, it is the proxy M3/GDP which will Granger cause unemployment. 
Moreover, escalating liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP by 1% will lessen the 
unemployment in Ghana and Nigeria. However, this impact will appear at long run that is 
the third, fourth and sixth year in Ghana; and only at the sixth year in Nigeria. The impact 
in those last countries are lower than those of Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire. In the case 
of Senegal both proxies of financial development do not Granger-cause unemployment. 
In addition, a positive shock on financial development will not impact the unemployment 
rate. 
The findings with money supply ratio contrast with the results of Shabbir et al 
(2012). Those with the ratio of domestic credit to private sector by banks correspond with 
the outcomes of Shabbir et al (2012) in Cape Verde and Cote d’Ivoire. However, 
whatever the proxy when it induces unemployment rate declining in the economy is 
consistent with the literature review. Consequently, policy makers must favor domestic 
credit to private sector in order to decrease unemployment level in Cape Verde and Cote 
d’Ivoire. For the others economies as well the two aforementioned, they must make 
inquiry into the impediments of firms to access finance. Moreover, for the Nigeria and 
Ghana, emphasis must be directed to the comprehensive money supply and also on 
microfinance because regular lending from bank is not sufficient to the reduction of 
unemployment levels. 
The aforementioned situation where financial development could not decrease 
unemployment in some countries matches with one theory of this research. Indeed, we 
stated that if only the wealthy, the educated and the politically connected profit of the 
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financial development, it will not favor job creation. The results of the enterprise survey 
showed in each sampled country a greater proportion of small and medium firms 
qualifying their access to finance as a constraint to the development of their activity. 
Moreover, fewer of them are granted of loans while more large firms enjoyed this 
financial service. This paper suggests financial development as a key to unemployment 
decrease. However further studies must focus implement a better model including more 
explanatories variables and a minimum length period of 30 years. Moreover, it is 
recommended to find out the obstacles which impede entrepreneurs in accessing loan. 
And finally priority must be given to domestic credit to private sector. Indeed, its positive 
effect in unemployment reduction last over time and occur at a fast pace than the 
comprehensive money supply. 
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ANNEX A 
 
Table 53: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Cape Verde  
Indicators 
Business Sector Firms size Ownership 
Manufac
turing 
Service
s 
Small  Medium Large Domestic 
10% or 
more 
foreigner 
Percent of 
firms with a 
bank 
loan/line of 
credit 
13.7 50.2 38.6 47.4 63.7 42.7 33.6 
Proportion 
of loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
89.3 98.5 87.3 95.6 100 89.4 96.4 
Value of 
collateral 
needed for a 
loan (% of 
the loan 
amount) 
212.4 174 201.2 137.2 161.3 180.2 n.a. 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
30.8 30.4 30.1 27.2 50 32.2 15.7 
Proportion 
of 
investments 
financed by 
banks (%) 
12.4 27.7 18.7 41 20.1 26.4 10.9 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as a 
major 
constraint 
3705 36.4 33.1 45.1 57.4 32.9 59.6 
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ANNEX B 
 
Table 54: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Cote d'Ivoire  
Indicators 
Business Sector Firms size Ownership 
Manufac
turing 
Services Small  Medium Large Domestic 
10% or 
more 
foreigner 
Percent of 
firms with a 
bank 
loan/line of 
credit 
10.3 11.9 10.1 15.9 37.4 11.9 8.8 
Proportion 
of loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
88 31.3 30.4 86.2 71 40.9 60.7 
Value of 
collateral 
needed for a 
loan (% of 
the loan 
amount) 
65 48.3 31.1 78.8 78.2 52.9 72.9 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
7.7 17.6 15.4 10.7 24.6 13.4 25.3 
Proportion 
of 
investments 
financed by 
banks (%) 
3.4 3.8 3.3 4.4 7.2 3.9 3 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as a 
major 
constraint 
82.3 61.1 66.4 73.3 45.4 70.3 40.6 
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ANNEX C 
 
Table 55: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Ghana  
Indicators 
Business Sector Firms size Ownership 
Manufac
turing 
Services Small  Medium Large Domestic 
10% or 
more 
foreigner 
Percent of 
firms with a 
bank 
loan/line of 
credit 
22.2 24.7 19.9 22.9 50.8 23.6 21.8 
Proportion 
of loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
85.3 74 70.6 87.9 95.3 79.1 82.3 
Value of 
collateral 
needed for a 
loan (% of 
the loan 
amount) 
212.7 258.8 259.8 213.4 215.8 246.9 n.a. 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
21.2 23.8 19.6 22.5 44.1 21.8 26.4 
Proportion 
of 
investments 
financed by 
banks (%) 
14.4 10.6 8.1 15 25.7 12.3 13.9 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as a 
major 
constraint 
58.4 66.2 71.5 52.1 23 66.5 39.4 
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ANNEX D 
 
Table 56: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Nigeria  
Indicators 
Business Sector Firms size Ownership 
Manufac
turing 
Services Small  Medium Large Domestic 
10% or 
more 
foreigner 
Percent of 
firms with 
a bank 
loan/line of 
credit 
3 4.4 2.9 5.8 14.2 3.6 23.2 
Proportion 
of loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
84.6 76 83 71.7 80.8 77.7 n.a. 
Value of 
collateral 
needed for 
a loan (% 
of the loan 
amount) 
159.4 128 147.2 106.4 n.a. 137.6 n.a. 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
              
Proportion 
of 
investment
s financed 
by banks 
(%) 
1.1 1.5 0.9 2 4.5 1.1 12.4 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as 
a major 
constraint 
55.7 51.1 59.3 37.1 13.2 53.3 25 
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ANNEX E 
 
Table 57: Relation Banking System – Private Sector in Senegal  
Indicators 
Business Sector Firms size Ownership 
Manufac
turing 
Services Small  Medium Large Domestic 
10% or 
more 
foreigner 
Percent of 
firms with a 
bank 
loan/line of 
credit 
16.1 14.8 10.8 28.1 55.5 13.9 36.7 
Proportion 
of loans 
requiring 
collateral 
(%) 
96.8 84.4 85.5 90.5 100 88.8 91.2 
Value of 
collateral 
needed for a 
loan (% of 
the loan 
amount) 
108 141 126.6 120 140.6 123.9 147.1 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
18.8 25.5 21.8 32.5 8.8 23.4 12.7 
Proportion 
of 
investments 
financed by 
banks (%) 
9.9 12.5 9 7 45.3 8.2 33.7 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
access to 
finance as a 
major 
constraint 
51.1 48.2 51.6 34.1 54.5 50 36.3 
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